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1 Introduction
The world is already locked into climate change,
regardless of our success at stabilising emissions.
Under a best case mitigation scenario, temperatures
will continue to rise until around 2050 (UNDP
2007). Developing countries will be among the most
exposed, with the physical impacts disproportionately
felt by poor and marginalised households and
communities. Economic, social and environmental
sensitivity to climatic conditions and poverty-driven
low adaptive capacity compound their exposure and
amplify existing challenges. Managing the inevitable
impacts of climate change will therefore be critical in
sustaining development achievements.
The objective of this article is to consider what we
know, and still do not know, about the economic
case for pro-poor adaptation, focusing on the
following propositions:
z That adaptation is integral to and indivisible from
development. Managing the impacts of a
changing climate requires a greater shift towards
climate-resilient development; and resilient
economic growth is a key element of this,
providing many of the opportunities and
resources required for adaptation
z That households and communities will
autonomously adapt but climate change risks
undermine already overstretched coping
strategies
z That well-functioning markets and a robust
private sector are important drivers of adaptation
in developing countries but will be constrained by
market failures and other barriers
z That governments have an essential role in
supporting pro-poor adaptation: deploying
poverty-focused measures to help poor people
avoid climate-driven poverty traps and addressing
constraints that limit autonomous adaptation and
provision of adaptation services by the private
sector
z That those governments will have to make
choices given budgetary constraints and the
additional costs of climate-resilient development.
There are many other factors to be considered outside
of this article, from the role of technology to the role
of institutions. This article considers what needs to be
done at a national level and by whom to ensure
limited public resources deliver pro-poor adaptation in
an efficient, effective and equitable manner.
1.1 Pro-poor adaptation
As it is a relatively new concept, there is no formally
agreed definition of pro-poor adaptation. In the
interim, the pro-poor growth agenda and its
absolute and relative definitions can be instructive
(Ravallion and Chen 2003; Ravallion 2004; Baulch
and McCulloch 2000; Kakwani and Pernia 2000).
Similar definitions could be assigned to pro-poor
adaptation: actions that reduce the vulnerability of
poor people to climate change, or actions that
reduce the vulnerability of poor people faster than
non-poor. This article will adopt an approach
focusing on absolute rather than relative gains, on
the basis that this is most useful to poor people who
are most directly affected.
2 What needs to be done: a shift in the
development approach
Adaptation is integral to and indivisible from
development. Good development practice is the best
way to deliver adaptation: increasing the resilience
and capacity to manage the impacts of a changing
climate. Educated, healthy people working in a
diversified economy will be rendered less vulnerable
overall and better able to deal with climatic shocks
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and change. Managing the impacts of a changing
climate increases the need and urgency for
development. But traditional development practice,
in turn, requires adjusting to take account of the
new, additional risks created by climate change.
In some areas, this will entail incremental shifts. For
example, scaling-up efforts in climate-relevant areas
such as irrigation and social protection schemes, and
ensuring that climate-sensitive measures themselves
take account of climate risks. This is important both
to protect achievements from being undermined by
climate impacts, but also to avoid inadvertently
increasing long-term vulnerability to climate change,
‘maladaptation’; for example clearing mangroves (a
natural coastal defence) to make way for tourism. In
others, it will also entail undertaking entirely new
measures that were not necessary under past or
current climate conditions. This may range from
reducing risks of climate-induced glacial lake
outburst floods to modelling climate change and its
impacts.
Together, these adjustments represent a shift
towards climate-resilient development, characterised
in Figure 1. Different countries will have to make
different adjustments determined by both their
needs (adaptation being location specific) and
resources.
2.1 The critical role of climate-resilient economic
growth
Economic growth is an essential driver of climate-
resilient development. It is recognised by many as one
of the most powerful defences against poverty, a core
barrier to adaptation (Collier 2007). For example,
Dollar and Kraay (2001) found over 80 per cent of the
reduction in poverty achieved since 1985 to have been
achieved through growth, with less than 20 per cent
a result of changes in inequality.1 Growth provides
people with the livelihood opportunities and
resources with which to build up their adaptive
capacity and better manage risks. It enables
governments to mobilise domestic revenue from a
broadening tax base to fund essential public services –
from health and education services that enhance
people’s prospects for employment and economic
advancement, to climate proofing and expanding
climate-sensitive and relevant activities and investing
in climate-specific measures such as responding to
glacial melting. There is much evidence that growth
benefits poor people on average as much as everyone
else in society, although this does not imply that
growth is all that is required to improve the lives of
the poor (Dollar and Kraay 2001).
Climate-resilient growth-enhancing policies should
therefore be a core element of a pro-poor
adaptation strategy. This is in recognition that
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Figure 1 Climate-resilient development
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economic growth is itself exposed to climate change
impacts. In Mozambique, for example, where water
infrastructure is undeveloped and irrigation use
limited, GDP growth rates are on average reduced
by at least 1.1 percentage points annually due to
sensitivity to water shocks (floods and droughts)
(World Bank 2005). Climate change can impact
growth in the short term by a loss of assets and
revenue sources (e.g. the La Nina drought in Kenya
caused damage in the order of 16 per cent of GDP
in each of 1998–99 and 1999–2000 financial years
(World Bank 2006), and over the longer term by a
worsening fiscal situation. For example, governments
switching expenditure from longer-term investments
such as education to shorter-term reconstruction
needs or, where it is available, increasing debt levels
to meet climate costs and consequences.
Climate-resilient growth again entails incremental
shifts to traditional approaches including, for
example, making public infrastructure investments
climate resilient. This is critical given planned levels of
infrastructure investment in developing countries,
and an opportunity to avoid the significant
retrofitting costs facing developed countries. But
new measures and approaches to growth may also
be necessary. This may include shifting economic
activity into entirely new sectors or significant
diversification. For example, given key fish species are
likely to migrate with rising water temperatures, the
Namibian commercial fish processing sector will
need to consider diversifying to other activities
rather than increasing long-term investments in this
sector, which presently represents almost one-third
of the country’s exports (UNDP 2007). Future
planning is essential in order to identify potential
activities that will be resilient in a changing climate
and where there is scope to develop new
comparative advantages. It is also important to
ensure that any shifts take account of future carbon
constraints, both to ensure that future exports are
competitive in an increasingly carbon constrained
world, and to avoid shifting to an economic strategy
that locks in a high carbon footprint that could
constrain a country’s future growth prospects.
3 Who needs to do what: the role of individuals,
households and communities
Individuals, households and communities are
predominantly responsible for managing the risks they
face from climate change (Tanner and Mitchell, this IDS
Bulletin, ‘Entrenchment or Enhancement’; Prowse and
Scott, this IDS Bulletin). They will typically have the best
information about their own specific situation and risks
they face. They have existing indigenous knowledge and
skills from dealing with past and current climate
variability. And they have strong incentives to act to
protect and sustain their livelihoods.
Indeed, people have been developing effective
coping strategies to manage natural climate
variability for centuries. For example, villagers in
Attapeu Province, Lao PDR, switch from farming to
fishing during August–October when floods typically
occur. In addition to ensuring their livelihoods are
sustainable, this is a beneficial coping mechanism as
it diversifies their predominantly rice-based diet and
increases vitamin and protein intake (UNFCCC
database 2008). Recognising the important role of
local coping strategies, the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has
compiled a database of experiences. This can facilitate
the transfer of long-standing coping strategies and
mechanisms, knowledge and experience from
communities who have already been adapting to
(naturally) changing climatic conditions to
communities that are newly exposed. This ranges
from lessons from community reforestation in Rio de
Janeiro to the experience of peasant farmers using
plant extracts to exterminate cattle ticks in Ethiopia.2
3.1 Constraints and poverty traps
Climate change however, risks overstretching already
strained coping strategies as households face new
threats and/or more frequent and intense climatic
events. Strategies that have been effective over
centuries may become insufficient or ineffective. For
example, many traditional risk-sharing mechanisms
based on social capital such as asset pooling and
kinship networks will be less effective when climate
change simultaneously affects families and
households in an entire region (as echoed in Prowse
and Scott, this IDS Bulletin).
Coupled with this, people will not always undertake
optional levels of autonomous adaptation due to
market failures and barriers that create disincentives
to adapt or inability to access the right adaptation
knowledge and tools. For example, institutional
constraints such as lack of property rights or civil
protection may prevent poor people from investing
their scarce resources in managing climate risks; for
example not making their property climate resilient
due to fear that the authorities will evict them once
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the work is complete (IFRC 2004). Or lack of
economy-wide resilience (e.g. non-‘climate-proofed’
public infrastructure) may prevent poor households
from reaping the benefits of their adaptation efforts.
For example, a Nepalese family were able to manage
the impacts of floods by successfully diversifying their
farming livelihood to include fisheries but were
unable to sell their produce as the muddy road from
Taratal to Sanoshree market was flooded (Mitchell et
al. 2007). Or, limited access to climate information
and tools may prevent people from being able to
adapt effectively (e.g. where new climate-resilient
seed varieties are not reaching rural areas).
Very poor and marginalised people (e.g. some
women, children, pastoralists, disabled people, or
indigenous people) face further barriers that limit
their ability to adapt. In addition to the above
constraints, they face economic, cultural and
institutional barriers that can prevent them from
accessing the adaptation tools and resources that
growth and the private sector (discussed below) can
provide. For example restricted land rights due to
institutional constraints make it difficult for women
in many developing countries to access credit; elderly
women may lack access to and knowledge of private
sector health services; cultural constraints limit girls’
access to education with which to enhance their
future economic opportunities; and a lack of voice
and influence in decision-making processes results in
community adaptation strategies or government
policies being less likely to address their specific
needs (as discussed in Demetriades and Esplen, this
IDS Bulletin; Polack, this IDS Bulletin).
Together these constraints limit the options for and
ability of poor people to adapt to climate change. In
the worst case scenario, they may be forced to
adopt extreme coping – or survival – strategies (in
particular very poor and marginalised people). In the
absence of savings, access to credit, or insurance, for
example, households may sell off their productive
assets on which their recovery depends. The costs of
this action are magnified by the low price they will
likely get for their asset, as others adopt similar
coping responses. For example distressed sales of
livestock in Ethiopia following the drought in 1999
sold for 50 per cent less than the normal price
(Carter et al. 2004). Similarly, households may have
little choice but to reduce their nutritional
consumption or take their children out of school,
thus undermining their long-term human capital and
earning potential. These survival strategies risk
pushing people further below the poverty line and
new people into poverty traps (as with extreme
climate variability today).
If poor individuals, households and communities are
to be able to manage the risks they face from
climate change, government support will be required
to help them overcome constraints and barriers, such
as those listed above. Poverty-focused measures will
need to be deployed, such as social safety nets and
livelihood diversification to help poor households
manage the risks of climate change. Governments
can also play an important role in enabling the
private sector to provide vital adaptation services for
poor people, as will be discussed below.
4 Who needs to do what: the role of markets
and the private sector
The private sector is a typically overlooked
implementer and driver of adaptation. Much of the
climate finance discussion, for example, is around the
need for the public sector (national/international) to
meet the additional costs of adaptation. However,
not only will it be impossible for the public sector to
undertake this alone given the scale of efforts
required but, in ignoring the role of the private
sector, public finance risks replacing investments that
the private sector may have voluntarily undertaken in
order to manage their own climate exposure.
Motivated by the need to protect their profits, the
private sector, from the small village farmers
described above to large multinational corporations
investing in developing countries, will have an
incentive to adapt.
The private sector can also help poor households and
communities to build their overall resilience and
undertake effective coping strategies, as described
above, especially those with access to markets in
developing countries. For example:
z Contributing to government tax base and the
public services this can support (as set out above)
z Providing essential elements of poor peoples’
adaptive capacity, including incomes through the
jobs they create, technical inputs through the
goods they produce (e.g. fertiliser) and risk
management tools through the services they
provide (e.g. finance)
z Raising awareness and incentivising climate risk
management behaviour among poor people
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through price signals they set through insurance
premiums or loan conditions
z Generating and delivering many of the new
investments and instruments required to manage
a changing climate, from new technologies (e.g.
drought-resistant crops) to climate protection
infrastructure (e.g. flood defences)
z Directly supporting the adaptive capacity of local
communities in order to improve their business
performance and risk management (e.g. to
increase employee productivity or support an
improved operating environment)
z Incentivising governments to address climate
change risks where these threaten economic
competitiveness, for example an unreliable water
supply or access to ports provides disincentives for
investments, in turn benefiting poor people who
also use this infrastructure.
These adaptation benefits will be driven by
international investors and banks through to small-
and medium-sized firms operating in developing
countries. There is already evidence of the private
sector helping to build the resilience of poor people.
For example, the owners of an aluminium smelter
project in Mozambique participated in a malaria
control programme to protect the success of their
project.3 There has subsequently been a decline from
85 per cent of children who lived near the smelter
being infected in 1999, to 20 per cent by June 2005.
Similarly, in Bangladesh, poor households reduce
their vulnerability to natural disasters by using
financial services to accumulate savings (Ferrand et al.
2004). These actions, while not undertaken to
address climate change risks specifically, contribute to
building adaptive capacity of poor people.
4.1 Market failures and constraints
While the private sector will be motivated to carry
out some autonomous adaptation efforts, pervasive
market failures and other barriers will prevent them
from undertaking socially optimal levels of
investment (as with individuals, households and
communities described above). This is both with
regard to their own autonomous adaptation and the
provision of adaptation services for poor people. This
is driven by factors including:
z Uncertainty and lack of climate information or
awareness that deters private actors from
ensuring their businesses or livelihoods are climate
resilient
z Competitiveness concerns that can create a
disincentive to adapt where this imposes an
additional cost and climate impacts are not certain.
For example, the engineering costs of a building
designed to withstand rising temperatures and
extremes will typically be greater than that of a
standard property and if property buyers do not
discriminate between properties on the basis of
vulnerability to future climate (due to lack of
information), the standard property will be more
competitive.
z Inability to capture the full benefits of private
actions that generate wider public benefits (e.g.
flood defences), in turn encouraging
underinvestment in adaptation
z Financial constraints that prevent sufficient
investments being made
z Shorter-term drivers that dominate private actors’
decision-making.
If the private sector is to help drive adaptation in
developing countries, governments will need to
intervene to provide the necessary tools and
incentives for them to adapt and help to overcome
current barriers to adaptation.
5 Who needs to do what: the role of government
Governments have a pivotal role in supporting pro-
poor adaptation. Recalling the need for a shift in the
development approach, a critical first step is ensuring
that adaptation is integrated into and across national
development plans and budgets, as described above.
But the government’s role expands beyond this. They
can also play a critical function in delivering poverty-
focused measures and providing poor individuals,
households and communities with the right
incentives, tools and capacity to adapt; and
addressing the market failures and barriers that
constrain autonomous adaptation and provision of
pro-poor adaptation services by the private sector.
5.1 Supporting autonomous adaptation by
individuals, households and communities
Government support is required in providing
poverty-focused measures that provide poor people
with a wider range of options and opportunities for
managing climate risks. This includes measures to
help them build their general resilience and move
into productive livelihoods but also to better manage
climate specific risks. This is particularly important
given that climate change is predicted to lead to an
increase in both frequency and intensity of climatic
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shocks, and the risk of cumulative impacts puts
increased pressure on already overstretched coping
strategies.
Traditional development tools can be applied to
manage these risks, from providing access to micro-
credit and social insurance, to providing social
protection schemes and asset transfers. In Mexico,
for example, transfers are provided conditional on
parents keeping their children in school and
undertaking periodic health checks. The programme
has resulted in a 23 per cent reduction in the
probability that children will leave school in the event
of drought or other shocks (UNDP 2007). A core
element to this strategy should be to support poor
and marginalised people in building up their assets
which, in providing them with the opportunities and
resources to build their overall resilience, are central
to increasing their adaptive capacity (as recognised in
Prowse and Scott, this IDS Bulletin). Coupled with
this, governments need to ensure that households
are able to maximise their returns from these assets
and livelihood opportunities, for example by
providing secure property rights and ensuring reliable
access to markets, as discussed above.
But these measures also need to be adjusted to take
account of the changing climate. More resources
may have to be allocated to these poverty-focused
measures as the number of people exposed to
climate risks and shocks increases. And traditional
measures will need to be screened for climate risks
as the exposure that people face is changing, from
increased frequency and intensity of extreme
weather events to exposure to entirely new threats
of which people have no prior experience (e.g. shifts
in malaria epidemics). This is also necessary in
considering the longer-term effects of these policies.
For example, providing poor people with social
insurance will help them to manage risks without
having to run down their assets or reduce
consumption. However, at the same time it is
important that this insurance does not encourage
people to stay in activities or locations that may no
longer be sustainable in light of climate change (as
the price signal that indicates rising risks is hidden by
government subsidies). Similarly, micro-credit
schemes need to ensure climate risks are factored
into loan agreements to ensure they are able to
support resilience and not lead to increased
vulnerability (e.g. if loans are used to purchase land
that will not have access to water in five years).
These changes represent ‘incremental shifts’ to
traditional development approaches, as discussed
above. In some cases, new policy instruments may
also be required that were not relevant or a priority
previously – for example health awareness campaigns
and mobile health units that provide malaria
assistance in areas previously unexposed. In
undertaking both incremental shifts and new
approaches to development, it is important to
recognise that poor people typically have high
discount rates, reflecting their focus on their
wellbeing (or survival) today. This creates
complications with the longer-term planning and
investment required for adaptation, which these
measures should help to overcome.
5.2 Supporting autonomous adaptation and
provision of adaptation services by the private
sector
Identifying ways to foster and leverage private sector
engagement on adaptation and market-driven
adaptation opportunities is also an important
element of a government’s pro-poor adaptation
strategy (OECD 2008). Stimulating the private sector
both to address their own climate risks and to deliver
adaptation services (from investing in new
technologies to providing insurance products) frees
up public resources that may otherwise have had to
be deployed to provide this support. It also helps in
protecting and generating public funds (from a
growing tax base), which can be used to deliver
poverty-focused measures to poor and marginalised
people who are most dependent on public assistance
and may not be serviced by the markets.
An important role for governments can include
helping the private sector overcome information
constraints that deters them from taking action. In
part, this entails investing in and communicating
climate information. Improved climate information
enables people to make rational and effective
adaptation decisions, helps ensure climate risks are
properly priced in the market and can encourage
adaptation-specific investments such as insurance.4
But even improved information will not necessarily
narrow projection ranges and therefore levels of
uncertainty will likely remain high. For example,
there are still large differences between models in
how they treat climate sensitivity despite improved
understanding of climate processes (Hallegatte
2008). Governments therefore have an important
role in helping to overcome this residual uncertainty.
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Setting long, loud and legal signals will also help
stimulate adaptation efforts by the private sector.
Compulsory regulations and performance standards
can help address this uncertainty barrier and
overcome competitiveness constraints, for example if
all buildings have to be built to a more resilient
standard. Credible enforcement systems are required,
however, for these measures to be effective.
Regulations can over-specify the risks, imposing
higher costs than necessary on the private sector, as
governments face the same climate uncertainties as
the private sector. These are the risks that
governments will need to weigh up in assessing the
benefits and costs of different policies, considering
also the risks of significant retrofitting costs or
irreversible impacts if action is delayed.
Credible signals that governments will not bail out
companies that do not take climate risks into
consideration is also a strong motivational factor for
action, and helps avoid risks of moral hazard. Finally,
the important role of the private sector in supporting
adaptation further reinforces the need for
governments to create a good enabling environment
to attract and retain private sector investment. Given
climate risks, however, this must also include a
credible adaptation strategy, as described above, to
overcome the threat of climate change becoming a
disincentive to invest.
6 Making choices with budgetary constraints
Shifting to climate-resilient development will entail
an additional cost – as well as benefits – at all levels
of the economy. Governments have limited public
resources with which to deliver on a wide range of
competing priorities, including adaptation. While
increased international funding will help to reduce
this budget constraint, it will still be limited.
Governments will therefore need to consider how
best to allocate limited public investment resources
in the face of competing demands: between
different economic sectors and activities, different
social groups and needs, and between different
adaptation measures.
6.1 Additional costs of adaptation
There are two drivers for understanding the cost of
pro-poor adaptation: to identify what combination
of measures generates the maximum returns given
binding budget constraints, and to be able to include
the necessary budget within expenditure plans. In
some circumstances, the costs will be minimal and
may even generate revenue or lead to cost savings in
the longer term (such as improving water efficiency).
It is important to note, however, that even where
adaptation may be cost-neutral or -positive, there
may be transitional costs involved that must be
managed.5 In other cases the costs may be
significant, whether it is expanding current
development priorities relative to plans today (e.g.
irrigation), making these investments climate
resilient, and/or investing in new targeted measures.
These additional costs are still very uncertain, and
will vary considerably between regions and sectors.
The available analysis tends to focus on global
adaptation costs, with guesstimates putting the bill in
the range of tens of billions of dollars per annum.6
These numbers are helpful in making the case for
additional international support, but less helpful in
prioritising climate-resilient choices or understanding
the additional budget requirements at the national
level.
Significantly more work is required to better
understand the costs involved in implementing climate-
resilient national development plans. One complication
in this exercise, in particular given its link to international
financing negotiations, is how to measure the additional
costs without creating perverse incentives to focus
exclusively on climate-specific measures (the top of the
pyramid in Figure 1). The specific adaptation benefits of
‘new approaches’ are more clearly measurable than the
‘incremental shifts’ and therefore ‘additionality’ to
development easier to prove. However, an exclusive
focus on these measures is not the most effective way
to adapt (either in terms of cost or the resilience
generated). More analysis is also required to measure
and quantify the benefits and costs of softer adaptation
measures, such as changing regulations, institutions
and, consequently, behaviour. The UK Department for
International Development (DFID), together with the
Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is funding a
research study with the World Bank to better
understand the benefits and costs of adaptation in
developing countries.
6.2 Benefits and costs
Understanding the benefits and costs of different
measures to build climate resilience is essential in
order to identify the most cost-effective adaptation
approaches. It also facilitates prioritising the most
effective strategies at national, sectoral and local
levels without increasing distributional inequalities,
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poverty indices and vulnerability among different
income groups and communities. However, there are
complications to this approach that need to be
considered:
z Difficulty in assigning monetary values to social
and environmental benefits and costs. If these
factors cannot be incorporated into governments’
decision framework, adaptation priorities will
always be skewed in favour of economic costing
criteria.
z Inadequate timescales. For example, the financial
costs of social protection schemes will be met in
a relatively concentrated period. If decision-
makers only compare the benefits accrued over
this short period they will ignore the avoided
long-term impacts on poor people’s growth
potential. This accrues over many years and to all
levels of the economy through improved
economic opportunities and higher productivity
levels and reduced long-term welfare expenditure.
z Transitional costs. For example, government
action in Rwanda to tackle a rising energy
(hydropower) crisis had a positive net adaptation
impact (e.g. increased rural electrification
programmes) but incurred short-term costs on
local communities that were no longer able to
use the now protected wetlands and lakeshores
as supplementary farming plots. These costs need
to be recognised and support provided to help
these communities diversify and enhance their
livelihoods (UNDP 2007).
7 Conclusions and recommendations
This article has focused on key elements of what we
know about the economic case for pro-poor
adaptation – what this should entail and by whom. In
the process, areas that require further analysis are
identified and captured below.
First, that adaptation entails a shift from traditional
development to climate-resilient development. It is
critical that adaptation is treated as integral to
development, rather than a standalone and separate
activity. However, exactly what mix of incremental
shifts and new approaches are required for ‘optimal’
adaptation will be country specific. More bottom-up
analysis is needed to understand how best to adjust
national development strategies to be climate resilient.
Second, just as growth plays a central role in poverty
reduction, so it is an essential element of any pro-
poor adaptation strategy. It equips people with the
opportunities and resources with which to build their
adaptive capacity. But growth is also vulnerable to
the impacts of climate change. Ensuring economic
growth strategies and achievements are themselves
climate resilient must therefore be a priority in any
adaptation strategy. Little research has been done to
date on the sensitivity of economic growth to
climate change, although the disaster risk reduction
literature can be instructive. Understanding these
sensitivities and where and how to increase
resilience in a manner that builds the long-term
competitiveness of economies is essential.
Third, that individuals, households and local
communities will undertake a significant amount of
autonomous adaptation, as they have been doing for
centuries. However, these existing strategies may
become ineffective and, in some cases, increase their
long-term vulnerability due to a combination of
increased risks from climate change and constraints
and barriers that restrict the scope and incentives for
autonomous adaptation. Governments have a vital
role therefore in helping people to overcome these
barriers and deliver poverty-focused support. More
analysis is needed to better understand the human
impacts of climate change and transmission
mechanisms. In turn, this should help inform
effective climate-resilient poverty-focused measures.
Fourth, that the private sector in developing
countries will also undertake significant levels of
autonomous adaptation and, together with well-
functioning markets, could play an important role in
helping to build adaptive capacity of poor people.
However, this has received minimal attention to
date. Much more analysis is needed to understand
the potential scope and scale of private sector
engagement, how this can be stimulated and
leveraged with public sector support, and what the
barriers may be that prevent the private sector
playing this function.
Finally, it is clear that governments can play a pivotal
role in supporting pro-poor adaptation. From
ensuring national development and growth
strategies are climate resilient, to delivering poverty-
focused support to poor and marginalised people
and providing the right tools and incentives for the
private sector to adapt and deliver adaptation
services. While these measures clearly generate
benefits (avoided impacts) they also have a cost. And
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even with additional international support national
budgets will have limits.
Governments (and the wider international
community) therefore need a better understanding
of the benefits and costs of adaptation, both to be
able to better prioritise between measures (with cost
as one of several determining criteria) and to budget
for adaptation. More analysis is therefore required on
understanding the expenditure requirements of
climate-resilient development plans. As an important
element of this, further work is also required on
valuing ecosystem services and work in the unpaid
economy, and on what equity weights to assign to
different social groups in prioritising between
adaptation measures.
More knowledge is needed on all these elements if we
are to better understand and progress in integrating
robust, pro-poor adaptation strategies into long-term
development plans and budgets in a context of high
uncertainty, potentially high future costs, and
competing needs. This will require concerted efforts by
national governments and research institutions,
through to the international community.
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Notes
1 This is in terms of reducing the number of people
living on less than $1 a day. There is wide
agreement in academia based on empirical
evidence that growth is the most important
factor in poverty reduction.
2 http://maindb.unfccc.int/public/adaptation/
(accessed 11 July 2008).
3 They identified malaria as a business risk affecting
the facility’s productivity through its impacts on
workers and their families that lead to absenteeism
and low staff morale, and becoming a less attractive
destination for skilled employees (Acclimatise 2008).
4 In the absence of this information, businesses may
be unwilling to invest, e.g. in risk mapping in case
(a) the market does not prove to be viable, or
(b) others can benefit from this information.
5 For example, by removing water subsidies in order
to improve efficiency in the way this resource is
used, a critical element of this adaptation
response is ensuring that poor people have access
to this essential resource.
6 For example, the World Bank, Oxfam, UNDP and
the UNFCCC Secretariat.
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